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updates from the regional human rights systems
European Court of Human
Rights
Portugal’s limitations of advocates
of abortion declared illegal
In Women on Waves and others v. Portugal, the Court gave strong backing to freedom of expression and found a violation of
the European Convention on Human Rights
in the very sensitive context of abortion.
Generally, the Court has so far refrained
from giving any clear answer to the question whether there is a right to abortion
under the Convention or on the contrary
whether abortion is prohibited. Yet, the
Court has been quite protective of freedom
of speech of pro-choice advocates. In 1992
in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman
v. Ireland, the Court found that the Irish
strict anti-abortion laws, which included
an absolute ban on abortion counseling,
violated the freedom of expression. The
present case decided on February, 3, 2009
follows this precedent.
A Dutch NGO, Women on Waves, operates a ship, which it sends to countries
where abortion is illegal. The ship then
sails into international waters where its
medical personnel can legally undertake
early abortions. In 2004 this ship intended
to come to Portugal and stay in its ports to
hold seminars and meetings on the topics
of the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, family planning, and the
decriminalization of abortion. The Portuguese authorities, however, prohibited the
ship to enter its territorial waters because
they claimed that it was to “distribute
pharmaceutical products not authorized by
the Portuguese health authorities” and to
encourage “the practice of certain illegal
acts.” The Portuguese government sent two
warships to enforce the order and patrol the
Dutch ship which remained in international
waters.
Seven judges had no problem to find
unanimously a violation of the freedom of
expression. They acknowledged the illegality of abortion in Portugal and the values
underlying it but stressed that freedom of
expression has the greatest value precisely
when its exercises “offend, shock and challenge the established order.” The Court
found as unsubstantiated the government’s
claim that illegal abortions were to be
conducted on the ship once in Portuguese

waters. Regarding the fear of distribution
of unauthorized medicine, the Court held
that other measures were available to the
government (such as seizure of the prohibited drugs) and that the outright ban on
access for the ship to its waters was clearly
disproportionate. Sending warships against
a civilian ship, according to the court, not
only negatively affected the rights of the
Dutch NGO but also had a chilling effect
on others wishing to exercise their freedom
of speech. Similarly, the Court dismissed
the government’s claim that the intended
seminars could take place by stressing that
it is not for the government to dictate how
and where freedom of expression can be
exercised. If Women on Waves wanted to
hold the seminars on the ship, it was their
right to do so.
The activities of Women on Waves
were part of a broader campaign to legalize abortion in Portugal. This aim was
finally achieved in 2007 when abortion on
demand until 12 weeks into pregnancy was
made legal after a non-binding referendum
to that effect.

States must take effective measures
to prevent killings
A violation of the right to life was found
by the Court in Branko Tomašic and Others
v. Croatia. Croatia has failed to take reasonable steps to prevent deaths of a mother
and a child killed by the mother’s former
partner and father of the child. The case,
decided on January, 15, 2009, serves as a
recapitulation of the positive obligations of
states arising from the right to life in the
European Convention on Human Rights.
The existence of positive obligations
under the right to life is well established
in the Court’s case-law and as such is not
disputed. States have an obligation first of
all to have in place criminal law provisions
to protect the right backed by effective
“law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of
breaches of such provisions.” Moreover,
in 1998 in the now classic case of Osman
v. the United Kingdom, the Court ruled
that if there exists a “real and immediate
risk to the life of an identified individual”
of which the authorities knew or should
have known, they must take reasonable
operational measures to prevent that risk
from materializing. The application of this
Osman test was an issue in this case.
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After their separation, the father repeatedly threatened to kill the mother and
the child. For that he was convicted of
death threats and sentenced to five months
imprisonment and was ordered to undergo
a psychiatric treatment in the prison. The
treatment was not, however, properly
administered. Several weeks after serving
his sentence the father went to the house of
the mother and the child and shot both of
them before shooting himself. The police
were tipped off by a neighbor who saw
the father approaching the house but they
unfortunately arrived twenty minutes late.
In applying the Osman test the Court
found that the authorities clearly knew
of the danger posed by the father. These
threats were real as evidenced by the fact
that he was imprisoned for them. Yet, the
Court found that Croatia failed to take any
adequate measures to reduce the risk. The
Court noticed that no search of the father’s
house was conducted to find out if his
claims that he possessed weapons to carry
out the killings were true. Further, the Court
stressed that the father was diagnosed in
need for continued psychiatric treatment.
Yet, his ordered psychiatric treatment was
about to last only two months and even
that short treatment was not conducted by
qualified psychiatric professionals. Moreover, no psychiatric assessment was conducted prior to his release. Consequently,
the Court unanimously decided that the
authorities failed “to take all necessary and
reasonable steps” to protect the lives of the
mother and the child and thus violated their
right to life.
The case is a testament to the strong
protection the Court affords to the right to
life, which it describes as “one of the most
fundamental provisions in the Convention.”
Here, even though the father had been
imprisoned for death threats and the police
arrived at the scene as soon as possible, it
was not enough to fulfill the states’ positive obligations arising from the right to
life. Even though such obligations cannot
put a “disproportionate burden on authorities,” they must nevertheless be effective
in protecting this fundamental right. Thus,
the test of reasonability of measures the
state must take to prevent killings is quite
high. That seems to be fully justified in
view of the finality of violations of the
right to life.
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A Selection of Other Recent
Significant Cases
In several cases the Court has been
faced with the unfortunately ever pervasive question of torture and other inhuman
treatment. In Atalay v. Turkey it found that
the prohibition of ill-treatment is so fundamental that its violations must be adequately criminally punished. Consequently
the short suspended imprisonment of the
responsible police officer and acquittal
on appeal of two others fell short of the
Convention’s standards and Turkey failed
to fulfill its positive obligations under
the prohibition of ill-treatment. In Ben
Khemais v. Italy the Court found that diplomatic assurances given by Tunisia, where
the applicant was to be deported, could
not be effective in view of the reports of
persistent torture in Tunisian prisons. This
judgment is another addition to the list of
decisions that held that diplomatic assurances in cases of torture cannot be deemed
effective. Whether they can ever be thus
becomes more and more questionable.
In A. and others v. the United Kingdom
the Grand Chamber of the Court on February, 19, 2009 confirmed the 2004 holding
of the House of Lords that the British post
9/11 scheme of indefinite detention of
non-British terrorist suspects was discriminatory and violated their right to liberty.
At the same time, though, it found that the
scheme did not per se constitute inhuman
treatment.
In Olujic v. Croatia the Court reminded
judges that they cannot publicly express
their opinions about a case or a party to a
case that they are about to decide. If they
do so they compromise their impartiality
in violation of the right to a fair trial of
the parties to the case. On the other hand
judges have the right to comment on the
internal affairs in the judiciary. In Kudeshkina v. Russia a judge was dismissed
because of disseminating deceptive and
insulting perceptions of the judicial system
after publicly questioning the independence of the Moscow judiciary. The Court
found this to be an illegal interference with
her freedom of expression.
A question of whether a disproportionate punishment can violate the European
Convention on Human rights was considered by the Court in the similar cases
of Ismayilov v. Russia and Grifhorst v.
France. In both cases the complainants
were convicted of not declaring the carrying of large amounts of lawfully acquired
foreign currency when crossing the border.
They were sentenced to a suspended term
of imprisonment and a fine respectively

and their money was confiscated. In both
cases the Court found a violation of their
right to property because the confiscations
taken together with the other penalties
were disproportionate and thus could not
be considered a proportionate interference
with their property.
In the largely identical cases of
Armoniene v. Lithuania and Biriuk v. Lithuania the Court delved into the issue of
insufficiency of damages for violations
of privacy awarded under national laws. It
found that the statutory limit on the amount
of damages which results in low awarded
damages disproportionate to the seriousness of the breach fall short of the positive
obligations of states to effectively protect
the right to privacy of its inhabitants. The
principal reason was that the limit diminishes the deterrent effect of the prohibition
on infringements of privacy.
In Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia the
Grand Chamber unified the Court’s diverse
interpretation of the non bis in idem rule.
It unanimously ruled that a second prosecution is prohibited if it arises from
identical or substantially the same facts
irrespective of their possible different legal
classification.

Inter-American System
IACHR Demands State
Responsibility for Forced
Disappearances in Ticona Estrada et
al. v. Bolivia
In its November 27, 2008 judgment in
the case of Ticona Estrada et al. v Bolivia,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Court) found Bolivia liable for the forced
disappearance of Renato Ticona Estrada.
The judgment marked the Court’s commitment to combating impunity and to guaranteeing adequate reparations for victims
of human rights violations.
Bolivia came before the Inter-American
system to address allegations by Estrada’s
family members that the state had violated
the human rights of Estrada, his brother,
Hugo, and their family members. Renato
disappeared on July 22, 1980, when he
and his brother were randomly detained
by military officers and tortured. While
the military officials transferred Hugo to
medical facilities following this treatment,
they handed Renato over to the Division of
Public Order, and he was never seen again.
This disappearance occurred amidst a pattern of repression and systematic human
rights abuses by the Bolivian military and
paramilitary groups, which came to power
through a coup d’état in 1980.
54

Bolivia responded to the alleged violations brought by the victim’s family members and the Inter-American Commission
for Human Rights (Commission) by issuing a partial acknowledgment of its responsibility. In particular, Bolivia recognized
its international responsibility for violating
Renato Ticona Estrada’s right to juridical
personality (Article 3), right to life (Article
4), right to humane treatment (Article 5),
right to personal liberty (Article 7), right to
a fair trial (Article 8) and right to judicial
protection (Article 5) as enshrined in the
American Convention on Human Rights
(Convention). In addition, the state recognized its responsibility for various provisions of the Inter-American Convention
on the Forced Disappearance of Persons
(IACFDP) and a series of provisions of
the American Convention relating to the
family members, including Hugo Ticona
Estrada. The state’s representative formally
apologized for these violations. Despite
this partial acknowledgement, however,
Bolivia contested the reparations requested
by the family members and the Commission, the alleged violations of Hugo Ticona
Estrada’s due process rights (Articles 8 and
25), and the violation of the IACFDP in
relation to Renato. Bolivia challenged the
reported failure to adopt domestic legal
provisions in accordance with the Convention (Article 2).
The Court found that the state failed to
comply with its obligations under Article 2
to adopt sufficient domestic provisions in
relation to forced disappearances. Specifically, Bolivia failed to define the crime of
forced disappearance in its domestic laws,
as required, until after the immediate case
was brought before the Inter-American
system. Although the violation had since
been rectified with the incorporation of
this crime into Bolivian law in 2006, the
Court held the state responsible for this
violation. The Court also found Bolivia
responsible for the due process violations
suffered by Hugo Ticona Estrada insofar as
the state had failed to investigate his claims
of torture, to punish those responsible, and
to provide full reparation.
On the issue of the IACFDP, the Court
found in Bolivia’s favor, noting that the
offense of forced disappearance does not
include a duty to hold detainees in a recognized place of detention because detention
does not share the same continuity over
time as does the forced disappearance.
Interestingly, although Bolivia had conceded responsibility for violating Renato
Ticona Estrada’s right to juridical personality enshrined in Article 3, the Court found
that no such violation had been committed
because the specific meaning of that right,
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that every person should be recognized
as having rights and obligations, was not
infringed in this case.
The Court prescribed extensive reparations, including pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages and took into consideration
the lost income of Renato Ticona Estrada
based on his life expectancy. The Court
directed Bolivia to expeditiously continue
criminal proceedings in relation to this
case, and to conduct a thorough and prompt
investigation into the matter.

Court finds Arbitrary Detention
Violations in Bayarri v. Argentina
On October 30, 2008, the Court issued
its judgment in the case of Bayarri v.
Argentina, holding that the unlawful and
arbitrary detention of Juan Carlos Bayarri
for thirteen years constituted a violation of
the right to humane treatment (Article 5),
the right to personal liberty (Article 7), the
right to a fair trial (Article 8) and the right
to judicial protection (Article 25) of the
Convention.
Argentina contested the admissibility of
the case before the Court based on Bayarri’s alleged failure to exhaust domestic
remedies. Although it had not challenged
the admissibility of the case before the
Commission, Argentina alleged that the
state had since offerred a domestic remedy
for Bayarri. The Court held that the possibility of a new domestic remedy did not
create another procedural opportunity for
a state to question the admissibility of the
petition; admissibility is established the
moment a petition is filed before the Commission, and at that time, Bayarri had no
effective domestic remedy available.
Substantively, the Court held that
Argentina had violated the Article 5 right
to humane treatment by subjecting Bayarri
to various forms of torture. The Court
found that Argentina had tacitly accepted
the legal determinations by its own domestic courts, which concluded in 2004 and
2005, respectively, that Bayarri’s confession had been coerced through torture and
that proceedings against him did not meet
domestic standards of due process. In addition, the Court noted that Argentina failed
to investigate Bayarri’s physical and mental
suffering with due diligence.
The Court also found a violation of Article 7 insofar as Bayarri had experienced
unlawful detention. In 2005, a domestic
court confirmed that Bayarri had been
detained without an arrest warrant and had

been held at a clandestine facility. He was
not promptly brought before a judge and
was held in preventive detention for thirteen years, a time period well beyond that
permissible under domestic law.
Further, the Court determined that
Argentina violated Articles 8 and 25, which
guarantee a fair trial and judicial protection, respectively. The Court observed that
it took fourteen years for domestic courts
to conclude an investigation of the facts
in this case. The first judgment against
Bayarri was handed down ten years after
his detention, and the final judgment of
acquittal was not issued until 2004. These
delays constituted a violation of Article 8.
Further, because Argentina’s ineffective
investigation made it impossible to clarify
the facts and to determine alleged criminal
responsibility, the state violated the Article
25 right to judicial protection.
Because the Commission had not previously deemed the family members victims,
the Court only considered Bayarri in its
reparations analysis. The Court prescribed
pecuniary damages for medical and psychological treatment and for future care,
as well as for lost earnings. In addition,
the Court mandated that Argentina must
conclude the criminal case against Bayarri
and ensure procedural protections in that
process.

Court Protects Lawyer’s Rights
to Privacy
The Court issued a judgment in the case
of Tristan Donoso v. Panama on January
27, 2009, holding that Panama violated
various rights of Panamanian lawyer Santander Tristan Donoso in relation to the
recording and dissemination of a phone
conversation between Donoso and a client.
Based on the contents of this conversation, which pertained to suspicious contributions to the political campaign of the
then-attorney general, the attorney general
initiated defamation proceedings against
Donoso, which culminated in a conviction
in 2004. Donoso and his representatives
subsequently petitioned in the Inter-American system for relief.
The Court analyzed the alleged violations of Donoso’s human rights, including
the right to privacy (Article 11), freedom
of thought and expression (Article 13), the
right to a fair trial (Article 8), and judicial
protection (Article 25). The Court found
violations of some part of each of the
articles alleged.

55

In determining whether there had been a
violation of Article 11, the Court observed
that the right to privacy is not absolute, but
rather must be protected from arbitrary and
abusive interferences. Because there was
no proof that the attorney general or any
other state actor had ordered or facilitated
the infringement on Donoso’s privacy, the
Court could not find that Panama had
violated Article 11 with the recording. The
Court then considered the dissemination of
the conversation to members of the press
and the church. The Court found that while
the state did have an interest in preventing potential defamation of its officials,
the attorney general’s actions in leaking
the recorded conversation to these parties
was an inappropriate strategy for pursuing
this interest. Additionally, the inflammatory language used by the attorney general
when he presented the recorded conversation to the church and others damaged
Donoso’s honor and reputation, both of
which are protected under Article 11. On
these grounds, the Court held that Panama
had violated Donoso’s right to privacy.
Regarding the alleged violation of Article 13, freedom of thought and expression,
the Court concluded that Donoso reasonably believed that the campaign involved
corrupt business practices. Thus, the Court
held that the criminal sanction imposed
against Donoso was manifestly unnecessary and violated his right to freedom of
expression.
Because Panama had conducted a diligent investigation in the matter against
Donoso, it did not violate its due process
obligations pursuant to Article 25. The
Court did hold, however, that because the
conviction against Donoso was based only
on an illegally-obtained tape, his conviction could not stand and his right to a fair
trial under Article 8 had been violated.
The Court called for a series of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages as reparation for Donoso. Additionally, it mandated
that Panama invalidate Donoso’s criminal
conviction.		
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